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THE CHALLENGES OF MULTIPLICITY 
Jennifer Nedelsky* 
INEsSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST 
THOUGHT. By Elizabeth V. Spelman. Boston: Beacon Press. 1988. 
Pp. xiii, 221. $11.95. 
Elizabeth Spelman 1 accomplishes a remarkable thing in Inessential 
Woman. She takes what has become a commonplace in feminism -
that we must attend more to race and class - and transforms it into a 
new conception of gender to which race and class are integral. At one 
level the conception is not new - its essence is the basic feminist in-
sight that gender is a social construction, not a biological phenome-
non. But Spelman shows that if we take that insight seriously, 
attention to race and class is not an option, but a requirement of the 
concept of gender itself. For me, Spelman's argument thus trans-
formed a sense of moral and political commitment to the issues of race 
and class into an ability to see the presence of race and class in gender. 
This transformation means that it is no longer a question of whether I 
will get around to doing the right thing by paying attention to these 
"other" issues, but whether there is integrity to my feminist projects, 
whether my work will be intelligible and defensible on its own terms. 
Spelman's extraordinarily important contribution is to show not 
just that we have not acted on what we said we believed, but that we 
did not really know what we thought we knew - namely, how to 
think about gender. And she does this not by adding a perspective, 
such as Marxism, onto feminism, but by unpacking the requirements, 
insights, and methodologies of feminist theories themselves. 
One might say that the core of her argument should have been 
obvious a long time ago. And indeed it should. It was obvious to 
women who were not part of the white middle-class audience to whom 
(I assume) Inessential Woman is primarily addressed. That this audi-
ence had not already learned the lessons Spelman teaches from, say, 
the available writing of women of color, is sad testimony to the privi-
lege and blindness Spelman examines. 
We - white middle-class feminists, of whom I am one - can now 
hear Spelman in part because she speaks our language. The book ad-
heres to the (best) norms of academic discourse: it is carefully ana-
lytic, well argued, and clearly written (though also extending beyond 
• A.B. 1970, University of Rochester; A.M. 1974, University of Chicago; Ph.D. (Committee 
on Social Thought) 1977, University of Chicago. - Ed. 
1. Associate Professor of Law and Poltical Science, University of Toronto. 
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the norms in its lively good humor). In her effective use of anecdotes 
from personal experience or literature, she does not simply rely on the 
imaginative capacity of the reader, but explicitly makes the connec-
tions to the philosophical argument. The impact of the book, how-
ever, comes not from the familiarity of its form, but the excellence of 
its content. Anyone who works her way carefully through the argu-
ments will not forget their message, nor fail to change the way she sees 
the world and interacts with it. Spelman has this transformative 
power because she is not just calling for inclusion, but is engaging in 
the analytic work of integrating gender, race, and class.2 That is diffi-
cult work, and while the core message may be familiar to many, I 
think her insights are likely to be useful to everyone who wants to 
understand the complex intersections that constitute gender. 
Finally, a last introductory note to white middle-class feminists 
who think they already know that race and class are important and are 
not interested in further (guilt-inducing) instruction: I urge you to 
inquire into what you know and what you do. Are race and class 
important simply because you want to improve the lives of all women 
and, of course, there are women of every race and class? Spelman is 
saying something more than this. She is showing that we cannot un-
derstand our gender relations without understanding the way that the 
gender of whites takes its meaning in part from the way we have con-
structed the relation between blacks and whites, owners and workers, 
and the genders of subordinated groups. Similarly, we cannot under-
stand the oppression of women of color unless we understand these 
interactions of the constructions of race and gender. And if your 
knowledge has not translated itself into action - if the importance of 
race and class is a belief, but not a constant part of your practice in 
teaching, research, and political action - then Spelman has a different 
kind of knowledge to impart. Spelman's insights cannot be passively 
absorbed. 
I 
The book begins, a bit slowly I found, with chapters on Plato and 
Aristotle (pp. 19-56). Spelman carefully, sometimes painstakingly, un-
packs the ways that each saw the gender of women differently depend-
ing on the class (such as guardians or slaves) to which the women 
belonged. The very meaning of "woman" - her capacities, whether 
or not she was subordinate to men, her relations to others - was dif-
ferent depending on her class. In these chapters Spelman introduces 
2. Compare the critique that "[m]ost Anglo feminists have been more responsive to hearing 
the call for diversity in membership than they have been to hearing the call for the analytic 
inclusion of race, class and gender." Uttal, Inclusion Without Influence: The Continuing Token-
ism of Women of Color, in MAKING FACE, MAKING SOUL - HACIENDO CARAS: CREATIVE 
AND CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES BY WOMEN OF CoLOR 42 (G. Anzaldila ed. 1990) [hereinafter 
MAKING FACE, MAKING SOUL]. 
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two of her main points: (1) women do not simply come in different 
colors and classes, but there is no single meaning of "woman"; (2) we 
nevertheless think of these philosophers as making claims about the 
nature and status of women, because we take their claims about some 
women (those in the superior group) to be claims about all women. 
Spelman also uses this introduction to raise the question of "the extent 
to which some versions of feminism may have more of Plato in them 
than they [feminists] might ever have imagined" (p. 35). 
Because it is a very tricky thing to transform something people 
already think they know (i.e., that race and class are important) into a 
new insight, I am not sure these chapters are a good place to start. 
Although they are part of a careful structure of argument, I found it 
took too long to see the novelty and importance of the insights. To the 
impatient, and to those who are skeptical that this book really offers 
them something new, I recommend beginning with the third chapter 
on Simone de Beauvoir, and returning to Plato and Aristotle after they 
are fully engrossed with the argument. 
In Chapter Three, Spelman demonstrates that even one as attuned 
to the issues of privilege as de Beauvoir may end up ignoring her own 
insights and reproducing the privilege of white middle-class women by 
making them the (generally unstated) focus of her inquiry. One of the 
most powerful of Spelman's arguments (spelled out more fully in 
Chapter Five) is that what appears as an obvious social-scientific tech-
nique - holding race and class constant to isolate gender oppression 
- not only misunderstands the nature of gender, but reinforces the 
privilege of white middle-class women by treating them as the paradig-
matic woman. The assumption that we can best study the nature of 
sexism by ensuring that its objects are not also suffering from other 
forms of oppression (and thus confusing our findings) guarantees that 
white middle-class women will be the subjects of inquiry. This 
method of studying "sexism as such" also tacitly assumes that sexism 
is the same for all women, that it does not vary according to race and 
class - which Spelman demonstrates is not the case. 
Spelman uses the contradictions in de Beauvoir to reveal how we 
also routinely, unthinkingly make the same moves and assumptions de 
Beauvoir does, and thus to argue that "we ought to think of the white 
middle-class privilege her work expresses, not as a personal quirk of de 
Beauvoir, but as part of the intellectual and political air she and many 
of us breathe" (p. 75). Spelman repeatedly and effectively shows how 
it is the nature of privilege to hide insidiously in unspoken assump-
tions, "common sense," and social-scientific "logic." "Privilege can-
not work if it has to be noted and argued for" (p. 76). 
For me the most compelling part of the book was the discussion of 
Nancy Chodorow's work on the reproduction of mothering. 3 Here 
3. Pp. 80-113; N. CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING (1978). 
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Spelman argues that if we take seriously the idea that gender is a social 
construction, and in particular if we believe that early childhood ex-
periences are a crucial part of that construction, then we will see that 
as those experiences vary by race and class the construction of gender 
must itself so vary. Again, Spelman reveals how Chodorow's own im-
portant insights undermine her conclusions about the relationship be-
tween gender, race, and class. 
Part of what has made Chodorow's work so important for many 
feminists is the argument that as children learn their gender identities 
they learn the relations of subordination and domination intrinsic to 
those identities. But Spelman contends that, in a racist society, these 
basic lessons of hierarchy must include race-specific roles. We learn 
not just to be girls and boys, but to be, for example, white girls or 
black boys. The message to all little boys cannot be that all men are 
superior to all women, for this message would be very dangerous for a 
black mother to give to her black boy. He must learn that the complex 
rules of domination and subordination that are part of his gender iden-
tity are different in relation to white and black women. Thus, the hier-
archy of gender cannot be, in any simple way, the model for learning 
other forms of hierarchy such as racial domination (as Spelman per-
suasively claims Chodorow suggests, pp. 88-89). Racism is embedded 
in the original learning of gender, not extrapolated from it. 
Spelman elaborates upon the implications of all of these arguments 
in the remaining chapters of the book. Each new dimension to the 
analysis adds nuance and clarity and integrates her insights more fully 
into the reader's framework of thought, changing that framework in 
the process. While the arguments can be fairly simply stated in sum-
mary form, it takes the full depth of her analysis to give the core in-
sights their rich originality and transformative power. My summary 
form thus runs the risk of making the claims seem either already fa-
miliar or unpersuasive in their novelty. I hope to have persuaded you 
at least of the importance of reading the book to find out if your own 
treatment of gender does not require an integration of race and class, 
or, to put it more harshly, whether that treatment unwittingly ex-
presses the white middle-class privilege that is part of "the intellectual 
and political air" we breathe (p. 75). I move now from the summary 
to questions internal to Spelman's argument, and then to the broader 
challenges her argument poses. 
II 
As is often the case with Spelman's arguments, her discussion of 
Chodorow leaves us with questions that only more research - of the 
kind she advocates - can answer. We often think of gender identity 
as one of the very earliest, pre-verbal dimensions of selfhood that chil-
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dren learn. Are the dimensions of hierarchy present at the earliest 
stages, and if so, are all the complex intersecting forms of that hierar-
chy (for example class as well as race and gender) present in some 
primitive form? Or should we think of these dimensions of hierarchy 
as developing over time, in which case some particular sequences of 
learning might be interesting and important? Once language is pres-
ent, do children of different races become conscious of racial identity 
at different stages? And how is the consciousness related to interpene-
tration of race and gender? My four-year-old is beginning to voice 
interest in questions of gender identity, but seems oblivious of racial 
differences. As far as I can tell, differences of skin color are simply one 
of the virtual infinity of differences with which he is confronted. He 
does not seem yet to have learned to attach any more significance to 
skin color than to hair color; indeed, I have no indication that he has 
ever even noticed either. Is he inattentive or indifferent to race be-
cause, as a child of the culturally dominant group, he need not learn 
"that the white world is dangerous and that if he does not understand 
its rules it may kill him"?4 And is his failure to be conscious that he is 
white the result not only of his parents' efforts not to perpetrate ra-
cism, but also of a cultural dominance so secure that he need never 
encounter messages like those of the southern white parents Lillian 
Smith describes: "We were taught ... to love God, to love our white 
skin, and to believe in the sanctity of both. " 5 
In short, if we are to pursue the best of Chodorow's insights into 
the importance of early childhood experience in learning gender iden-
tity and hierarchy (as I believe Spelman intends us to), we need to 
know more about the mechanisms of this learning - including issues 
of sequence, language, and consciousness. If gender hierarchy is not 
the progenitor of other forms of dominance, we need to find out just 
how race, class, and gender intersect in the emergence of identity. 
Spelman persuasively argues that, given the nature of racism in 
America, it is unimaginable that gender could be constructed indepen-
dently of race. She thus points to the need for the kind of research I 
have noted just above. But, in Inessential Woman she does little more 
than provide glimpses of how, say, the gender of both blacks and 
whites is shaped by racism and how racism is interpenetrated by sex-
ism. The clearest and most compelling examples come from examin-
ing the relations among black slaves and white slave owners. She 
helps us see how racism and slavery shaped the relation between black 
men and women, how "we can't understand the racism that fueled 
4. P. 98 (quoting w. GRIER & P. CoBBS, BLACK RAGE 61 (1968)). 
5. P. 99 (quoting L. SMITH, KILLERS OF TiiE DREAM 77 (1949)). I think it is worth noting 
that my son grew up in Toronto, Canada. As I revise this essay in Chicago, I doubt that he 
would have remained unconscious of race here. In Toronto, he is routinely exposed to racial 
diversity, but not to the constantly simmering tensions of black-white relations that pervade 
Hyde Park. 
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white men's lynching of Black men without understanding its connec-
tion to the sexism that shaped their protective and possessive attitudes 
toward white women" (p. 106), and how sexism can be at work even in 
relations between women. Acts of racist violence by white women 
against black slave women "were shaped by feelings of sexual jealousy 
rooted in and sustained by sexism" (p. 106). 
The slave examples are illuminating, but I was left wanting more 
details about exactly how race and gender interpenetrate in contempo-
rary America. For example, Spelman does not explain fully how a 
black woman's gender is different from a white woman's. And she 
spends little time showing how we would see gender issues differently 
once we accept her point. For example, one might ask, "aren't the 
basic issues of feminism, such as violence against women and repro-
ductive rights, the same for all women?"6 Her book provides an im-
portant general answer: we should not assume they are the same; we 
should find out how, say, black women see these issues. But she does 
not provide the sorts of specific answers my students gave me: white 
women's discussions of violence against women are often laced with a 
tacit racism; they are shaped by an unspoken image of the assailant as 
a man of color. Women of color are of course concerned about vio-
lence (as prime targets of it), but they want to be sure that the ap-
proach to the problem is not shaped by the racism they commonly 
observe. Similarly, white women's focus on access to abortion often so 
neglects the practice of encouraging abortion for, and forcing steriliza-
tion on, women of color that the issue becomes unrecognizable as a 
common one. 
Such concrete examples will enhance our understanding of Spel-
man's argument and of its importance. But Spelman's point is in part 
an analytic one, and she makes it completely persuasively: given our 
understanding of gender as a social construction, race must be integral 
to gender. The point is clearest in its negative form: What would we 
have to believe to continue to think it adequate simply to add race to 
gender, to imagine that racism and sexism function independently, and 
thus merely additively, for, say, black women? We would have to be-
lieve that the factors that are part of the social construction of gender 
- patterns of child-raising, messages about sexuality, independence or 
interconnectedness, 7 dominance, competence, physical beauty and ca-
pacity - are not significantly different for blacks and whites. The less 
6. As my colleagues Cass Sunstein and David Strauss did ask when I summarized Spelman's 
arguments. 
7. Chodorow's arguments have also been enormously influential through the use made of 
them by Carol Gilligan. c. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982). There and elsewhere 
what is at stake is the argument that the different experiences of being mothered that little boys 
and girls have affects their different senses of themselves as basically separate or basically con-
nected. Spelman shows that such claims, too, have to be reconsidered: "Chodorow tends to 
write as if the kind of care mothers provide is everywhere the same - despite her acknowledg-
ment of the likelihood of cultural difference on this score. There is indeed no reason to presup-
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analytic and more complicated point is that the meaning of sexuality 
that is a central part of gender identity is, for blacks and whites, de-
fined in part in opposition to one another. Here, a detailed sense of 
how this works is especially important, 8 and Spelman offers little more 
than the examples from slavery. But as always, what matters here is 
that she shows what our task must be: if we want to understand gen-
der, we need to find out how it is reproduced by the intersecting re-
pressions of our society. 
Spelman indirectly reveals some of the problems of pursuing this 
task. First, the reader will no doubt have already noticed that 
although I referred to race and class at the outset, most of the discus-
sion has been about race. This imbalance reflects that of the book. I 
think the analytic framework is unaffected, but the imbalance reminds 
us of the full demands implicit in Spelman's integrative project. Not 
only is class a dimension of gender,9 but it interacts with race, too. In 
paying attention to class, one must remember Spelman's arguments 
about why one cannot simply "add on" the dimension of race. Saying 
that black women suffer racism and sexism is true but misleading be-
cause it suggests that the racism they suffer is the same racism black 
men suffer and the sexism they suffer is the same sexism white women 
suffer. Black women suffer not only doubly, but differently. So when 
we try to take seriously the way class and race shape each other, and 
shape and are shaped by sexism, we see a problem of ever-increasing 
complexity unfolding before us. And of course we cannot just attend 
to class when we are dealing with the gender relations of those in 
pose that what counts as 'mother's love' will not vary from culture to culture, from subgroup to 
subgroup" (p. 99). · 
8. Wendell Berry has explored the harms of racism, including the way it shapes both blacks' 
and whites' experience of sexuality: 
A great deal has already been made by various writers of the way white men have attrib-
uted to black women the active sexuality that they did not want to see in their own women, 
because they did not consider sexuality to be ladylike. This is usually discussed with respect 
to the damage it has done to the pride of the black man and to the relationships of black 
men and black women. On the other side of the problem, it made the white man by turns 
either crude or absurdly sentimental in his relationships with the women of his own race, 
unable to bridge the artifical dichotomy between sex and sentiment in order to know his 
women as they really are. And it tended to make the white woman of the landed class in the 
South a functionless ornament, possessing only the powers of prettiness and charm, obsolete 
by the age of thirty, artificial, pretentious and silly, practicing the manners and the affecta-
tions of a world that never did exist and never could have. All that is obvious enough, and 
so I want only to mention it - adding, however, that the consequences of this sexual disori-
entation go far beyond the considerable unhappiness it has caused to individuals. It has 
poisoned the very heart of our co=unity. It is as destructive a force as any other that we 
have let loose. 
W. BERRY, THE HIDDEN WOUND 78-79 (1989). 
9. The movie Working Girl (CBS/Fox 1988) offers an effective picture of the differences be-
tween the way gender is constructed for upper middle-class professional women and for the 
"working girls" who are their secretaries. Unfortunately, the gentle challenge it poses to the 
interpenetrating oppression of gender and class is offered in the context of reinforcing one of the 
lynchpins of patriarchy: the upper-class prince charming hero without whom all the heroine's 
efforts would have failed. 
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subordinated classes. As long as class, race, and gender are grounds of 
oppression for anyone, they intersect for everyone. to 
Now the reader will probably also have noticed that even when one 
ensures that class does not drop out of the equation, it is still too sitn-
ple. Societies systematically accord different power, privilege, and ad-
vantage on grounds of religion, ethnicity, sexual preference, and many 
others. Spelman periodically refers to these grounds and, in principle, 
analytically encompasses them. But she does spell out fully this ever-
fracturing set of interconnections. Must we now abandon not only the 
category of women, but even categories of white or black women, to 
replace them with "categories" whose specificity begins to lose the 
character of a category at all: young, light-skinned black, female, het-
erosexual, bilingual, able-bodied, working-class parentage, Catholic, 
itnmigrant, urban, college-educated, unemployed, feminist, Marxist, 
poet? 
Confronted with this specter of infinite fragmentation, we need to 
remind ourselves of the project with which we started. At a basic 
level, Spelman sets out to reveal how mainstream feminism partici-
pated in the perpetuation of white middle-class privilege and' misun-
derstood the nature of gender in a system of race and class oppression. 
She seeks to understand the oppression of women as part of a complex 
of intersecting oppressions. Which categories are itnportant in that 
complex will depend on the context. For example, in some communi-
ties in the United States, the gender of Irish Catholic working-class 
women is not fully understandable without attention to religion and 
ethnicity as well as class and race. Surely religion is also crucial for 
understanding the gender of Orthodox Jewish women. 
These examples raise the question of whether the problem of infi-
nite fracturing is contained by saying that not every form of diversity 
matters - only those that are part of a hierarchical ordering of power 
resulting in oppression. But I think these examples offer little hope of 
such containment. First, even if oppression as a Catholic or Jew is not 
what is most itnportant about a woman's identity as Irish Catholic or 
Orthodox Jew, the basic dimensions of her gender - her sexuality, 
relations to men, expectations of her role as mother - and her experi-
ence of oppression on the basis of gender are not fully comprehensible 
10. The universal quality of this claim requires comment. Spelman's examples are drawn 
from the United States, but she clearly intends them to apply beyond national boundaries. I 
think the fully nuanced version of the claim is that, in any society where race and class are 
grounds of oppression, one should look to see if gender is not constructed differently for different 
groups and to see if the construction of privilege of class and race does not have within it impor-
tant rules about how men and women relate to each other. Spelman makes no claim that a 
system where the forms of oppression do not interact is an impossibility, just that this is hard to 
imagine on the basis of our experience of Western society generally, and that one should always 
inquire into interactions. For example, for there to be no interaction between class and gender, 
one would have to imagine that the privileges of class did not contain different rules for how 
working-class men should relate to upper-class women and to women of their own class. 
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in isolation from these components of her identity. Second, these ex-
amples should remind us that there are few categories of human iden-
tity that are not hierarchically ordered in North American society,11 
and those hierarchies accord different advantages that are often the 
source of oppression. Further, they help us see that identities are in 
large part constituted by the multiple intersections of hierarchically 
ordered categories, with the result that women may be privileged with 
respect to some (white middle-class) and subject to oppression with 
respect to others (lesbian, Jewish). Being driven to a sometimes daunt-
ing appreciation of multiplicity thus helps us avoid the mistake of sim-
ple categorization of women as either agents or objects of oppression. 
(Of course, this mistake can only occur after overcoming the most ba-
sic error of thinking that, as victims of sexism, women cannot be per-
petrators of other forms of oppression.) 
I think embracing multiplicity (rather than fearing it as a disrup-
tion of workable categories) also makes it possible to really hear the 
diverse stories of oppression. One of the things I was most struck by 
in Gloria Anzaldua's wonderful anthology of "creative and critical 
perspectives by women of color" 12 was the expression of the particu-
larity of the pain of oppression - from that of light-skinned black 
women to that of the children of mixed race growing up amid mixed 
and conflicting cultures. Taken as a whole, the book seeks commonal-
ity (among women of color), always in the context of attending to the 
full, dazzling (and threatening) array of difference. 
We are left, however, with the questions of what is the basis of 
commonality: How do we use categories once we recognize their 
transformation through multiple interaction? Or, as Spelman ad-
dresses it in her final chapter: Is there any "woman" left on which to 
base the claims of feminism? Spelman's basic answer is that nothing in 
her argument undermines the theoretical or practical agenda of 
feminism: 
[I]t is not a threat to the coherence of feminism to recognize the exist-
ence of many kinds of women, many genders. It may in fact help us to 
be more willing to uncover the battles among women over what "being a 
woman" means and about what "women's issues" are .... Yes, we may 
want and need to make a united case against a hostile world. But it is 
also necessary and hence a healthy sign that we battle over what that 
case should be, rather than relegating the making of it to the usual 
spokeswomen .... And why should we expect that women would not 
want and need to engage in such debates, given the recognition that gen-
11. And almost surely in Western societies generally. But I limit my claim (large as it is) to 
societies of which I have had long-term, firsthand experience. Search for an example of diversity 
so trivial that it has no hierarchical status accorded to it. It is hard to find one. Hair or eye 
color, for example, includes quite clear hierarchies. Ask the dark-haired teenage girl in Califor-
nia or the Asian preschooler watching Disney videos. 
12. MAKING FACE, MAKING SOUL, supra note 2. 
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der is a social and political construction and given the feminist hope that 
women will have more and more to say about the ways their lives and 
the meaning of their lives are constructed and lived? [p. 176] 
I find all this completely persuasive, if a trifle too rosy-sounding. 
Anzaldua's anthology makes clear the pain, anger, and conflict that is 
entailed in working out commonality in diversity. 13 I can only assume 
that the pain and conflict entailed in developing genuine solidarity be-
tween white women and women of color is even deeper. Among other 
things, we must find a way of contesting categories that simultane-
ously permits us to listen to each other across barriers of privilege, and 
helps us use categories such as race and class in ways that further the 
dismantling of privilege, without becoming ensnared in categorical de-
bates that deflect our energy from connection and change. 
For example, who counts as white or "of color" is contested. 
Some Jewish women say that they are not white. 14 But Gloria 
Anzaldua seems certain that it does not follow from this self-categori-
zation that Jewish women are women of color: 
Most of the white Jewishwomen in the class [on "U.S. Women-of-
Color''] did not want to identify as white (I'm not referring to the Jewish 
women-of-color). Some declared they felt they "belonged" more to the 
women-of-color group than they did to the white group. . . . Some 
mujeres-de-color questioned the concept of "same" oppressions and 
claimed that all oppressions were being collapsed into one. The problem 
was that whitewomen and white Jewishwomen, while seeming to listen, 
were not really "hearing" women-of-color and could not get it into their 
heads that this was a space and class on and about women-of-color. 15 
Because we recognize that race is a socially constructed category, 
there can be no simple "truth" as to who is really white or "of color." 
We must listen hard to Anzaldua's and her students' perception of 
what it means to be a woman of color and to the experiences of Jewish 
women and their sense of where they belong. Working though the 
conflict should make it clearer just how racial categories are con-
structed in our society, how they may be interfering with our capaci-
ties to hear one another, 16 and how they can best be used or 
deconstructed to understand and overcome oppression. 
13. See, e.g., Harris & Ordona, Developing Unity Among Women of Color: Crossing the Bar-
riers of Internalized Racism and Cross-Racial Hostility, iii MAKING FACE, MAKING SOUL, supra 
note 2, at 304 [hereinafter Harris & Ordona, Developing Unity]. 
14. This issue recently arose in my class on Feminist Theory. A Jewish woman reported that 
in conversations about antisemitism with Jewish women friends they said, "You're not white," 
implying (as I heard it) that she was deluding herself by thinking of herself as white. 
15. AnzaldUa, Haciendo caras, una entrada: An Introduction, in MAKING FACE, MAKING 
SOUL, supra note 2, at xx. 
16. An example of miscommunication is my own initial misreading of the quoted statement 
by Anzaldua. I thought the dispute was whether Jewish women were or were not "white." I 
thought that because there was disagreement over whether they were women of color, that meant 
that there was dispute over whether they were white....:.... thus disputing their own self-perception. 
When discussing this issue with Patricia Williams, I could see that one could accept their self-
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Critical self-consciousness in the use of categories is what matters. 
Spelman suggests that we can continue to "refer to women 'as women' 
or to men 'as men.' I am only insisting that whenever we do that we 
remember which women and which men we are thinking about" (p. 
186). I think the discipline of that self-consciousness is extremely im-
portant. If we always force ourselves to add the necessary adjectives, 
we can better determine when it is adequate to speak only of white 
middle-class women, and when we must educate ourselves further so 
that we can make broader claims. 
Finally, to recast these issues in another form: Is there no essence 
of womenness? Maybe there is and maybe there isn't. All we know 
for sure is that we cannot possibly find out by extrapolating from the 
experience of white middle-class women. Spelman closes her book 
with some helpful guidelines about how (and how not) to go about 
educating ourselves adequately for any of the projects of feminism, 
including the questions of essentialism. 
III 
In this final section, I want to move on to a brief sketch of the 
more general problems posed by Spelman's insights, because they are 
characteristic of the deep challenges that feminism raises for conven-
tional understandings of law and theory. The celebration of differ-
ence, making diversity central to all inquiries, not only disrupts the 
conventional categories, but also undermines the identity among 
human beings that has been a presupposition of our understandings of 
law and politics. 
Spelman's multiplicity resonates with the rejection of the tradi-
tional subject of political theory: man as a rational, autonomous be-
ing, where rationality is set in opposition to emotion and the essence of 
man as actor can be seen as a genuine essence shared by all. This 
essence abstracts from (and denigrates) the bodily dimensions of hu-
manness, including needs, desires, and affects. While many may think 
they no longer accept the starkness of the Kantian rational actor (for 
whom affectless, rational duty is the only foundation for moral action), 
Kant's aspiration to achieve universality by removing contingency re-
mains a powerful force in political theory, and perhaps even more so 
in law, which often relies on unexamined theoretical presupposi-
tions.17 And disembodied rationality continues to appeal as the core 
of an essence that can be common to all (thus universal) precisely be-
cause it excludes the contingent and the variable. 
description as not white, and still treat as contested whether they belonged to the women of color 
group. 
17. Given the purposes of most legal arguments, they do not include an examination of the 
concepts - such as selthood, rationality, or agency - that are the underlying presuppositions 
necessary for the coherence, persuasiveness, or even intelligibility of the arguments. 
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By contrast, the feminist theory that I know characteristically in-
sists that we cannot know the things we most need to know about 
people for the purposes of political theory or practice (including law) 
unless we treat as central their embodiedness and the affective dimen-
sions of their lives. This is in part because our cognitive capacities do 
not divide up in the ways the opposition between reason and desire 
suggests.18 But when we make embodiment and affect central, diver-
sity immediately confronts us in all its overwhelming multiplicity. 
When we turn our attention to bodies and desires, we unavoidably 
turn our attention to the immense range of differences among us and 
to the contingency and variability of those differences. Diversity not 
only becomes the foreground in our vision, it begins to preclude per-
ception of any background of commonality. Now this turns out to be 
a serious problem because of the drive for unity - the "logic of iden-
tity," as Iris Young calls it19 - that has characterized Western polit-
ical thought. 
Those of us educated in the dominant tradition of Western polit-
ical and legal thought have assumed that we cannot think theoretically 
or act politically unless we can presuppose some basic identity among 
people. Consider, for example, the way the conventional conceptions 
of a structure of rights that defines and regulates the claims and obli-
gations among people presupposes that we can think of people in some 
basic way as interchangeable units. In making arguments about rights 
we routinely make statements like, "If A does this to B then B has 
these claims against A. Even if we, of course, define some of the con-
text, we must be able to leave large parts of it out so that '~" and ''B" 
have meaning as references to all (interchangeable) people. For such 
sentences to make sense, we must be able to presume a high level of 
generality, of identity among people, so that we can immediately see 
that when Sue hits Harry this is an instance of the rule: "When A hits 
B." But if the meaning of the encounter between Sue and Harry is 
discernible only by attending to the full particularity of the context, 
including the nuances of the relationship between Sue and Harry, then 
it is hard to see how there can be any rule using '~" and ''B" that 
would be useful. 20 
18. See, e.g., Mullett, Shifting Perspective: A New Approach to Ethics, in FEMINIST PERSPEC-
TIVES: PHILOSOPHICAL EssAYS ON METHOD AND MORALS 109 (L. Code, s. Mullett & c. Over-
all eds. 1988); Young, Impartiality and the Civic Public, in FEMINISM AS CRmQUE 57 (S. 
Benhabib & D. Cornell eds. 1987). 
19. Young, supra note 18, at 57. 
20. Many readers will recognize here the parallel with Carol Gilligan's description of the 
differences between eleven-year-old Jake and Amy's response to the question of whether Heinz 
should steal the drug, which he cannot afford and without which his wife will die. Jake immedi-
ately sees that the interviewer intends this as a problem solvable by general categories: life is 
worth more than property, so Heinz should steal the drug. Amy will not see it that way, insisting 
on exploring the relation among the actors to see if an accommodation can be found. Gilligan 
perceives the significance of the abstractions Jake uses: "Transposing a hierarchy of power into a 
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The full implications of the infinite regress of specificity should be-
gin to be apparent. In the face of fracturing categories of identity, 
legal and political theorists must ask what provides the common 
ground for their characterization of people as bearers of rights. Do 
these characterizations in fact presuppose some essence (such as ra-
tional agency) as the foundation for shared rights? We begin to see 
(again and in new ways)21 how our concepts of rights require a com-
monality that is in fact an identity that makes interchangeability 
possible. 
Ifwe accept the "inessentialness" of women (and men) for the pur-
poses of Spelman's argument, we are confronted with a series of 
problems that extend far beyond her particular project: Is no general-
ization of either our knowledge claims or our entitlement claims possi-
ble? Am I limited to statements about my own personal experiences 
and those of other, specifically identified women I know of? Will even 
a qualifier of "white middle-class professional" be inadequate to sup-
port generalizations? Can I only ever think well about the obligations 
and entitlements of particular people whose circumstance I know in 
richly textured detail? If so, then this is the end not only of theory as 
we know it, but of all familiar structures of rights or rules of law. 
Of course, the first move might be to dismiss the infinite regress of 
specificity as a silly extension of the basic insight. But I do not think it 
silly either in theory or in practice.22 In theory, feminist demands that 
we make particularity, context, and diversity central, that we learn to 
be wary of generalization, that we pay attention to a multiplicity of 
voices and perspectives without assuming that they will fit into any 
preconceived category, indeed that we expect and welcome a disrup-
tion of categories linked to privilege - all of these demands will lead 
us toward specificity. At the same time, feminist theory suggests paths 
through specificity to visions of wholeness, new ways of describing pat-
terns of connection that are true to our actual, diverse experiences. 
For example, the theoretical stance I have been discussing is itself 
an important point of commonality, a reflection, I think, of some 
shared vision of the world - and thus not a common sense of having 
nothing in common. I find it very heartening that I see a deep congru-
ence in the attention to diversity and particularity in the writings of 
feminists whose backgrounds, starting points, and fields are very dif-
ferent from one another.23 
hierarchy of values, be defuses a potentially explosive conflict between people by casting it as an 
impersonal conflict of claims." C. GILLIGAN, supra note 7, at 32. 
21. Of course arguments about the atomist, rights-bearing creatures of liberal legalism have 
been around for a long time. 
22. Remember my argument earlier that it will not help much to try to limit the regress by 
attending only to those dimensions implicated in power and oppression. 
23. One can see these striking convergences across even such completely different projects as 
Evelyn Fox Keller's exploration of bow we build scientific theories, E. KELLER, REFLECTIONS 
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In practice, I see a similar impact of diversity. I see groups of 
feminists fracturing along the ever-finer lines of intersecting oppres-
sions (though still primarily race, sexual orientation, language, and 
class). I also see an effort at genuine solidarity, a solidarity based not 
on a posited sameness, but on an appreciation of the full particularity 
of difference. The fracturing is a real problem, but the solidarity re-
mains a real possibility. To insist that the knowledge of each other 
necessary for genuine solidarity must be based on attention to differ-
ence rather than posited sameness is neither to deny commonality nor 
to foreclose connection. It is to direct attention to what could make 
knowledge of commonality possible and connection real rather than 
illusory, equal rather than hierarchical. Because posited sameness has 
always had an implicit norm that finds some wanting, the insistence on 
difference is a source not only of fracturing, but of the possibility of a 
solidarity whose precondition is not compliance with hierarchical 
norms. 
Before proceeding with my argument about the disruptive implica-
tions of (infinite) multiplicity, I want to address one obvious objection 
that is likely to keep occurring to the reader. It is an objection nicely 
captured by a Sesame Street segment. 24 The segment shows children 
of diverse racial and ethnic backgrounds running and playing to-
gether, and then focuses in on their different faces. The background 
song sings (something like): "Whoever you are, whatever you look 
like, underneath we are all the same. We laugh when we are happy" 
- the camera now shows different children doing each of these things 
- "we cry when we are sad, we shiver when we are cold, we sweat 
when we are hot." This was the egalitarian message of the 1960s and 
1970s. We are really all the same; differences don't matter. Focus on 
sameness, for a focus on difference has been the hallmark of prejudice. 
It is our sameness that matters for what we really care about: mutual 
respect and our equal status as citizens. And this, my imagined objec-
tor would argue, is also what really matters for law and politics. 
What is wrong with this objection is not that there is nothing we 
ON GENDER AND SCIENCE (1985), Carol Gilligan's arguments about the fonns of reasoning she 
calls the ethic of care, C. GILLIGAN, supra note 7, and Starhawk's invocation of witchcraft as a 
source for understanding the interconnections of the world, STARHAWK, TRUTH OR DARE: EN-
COUNTERS WITH POWER, AUTHORITY, AND MYSTERY (1987). See also c. KELLER, FROM A 
BROKEN WEB: SEPARATION, SEXISM, AND SELF (1986); A. LoRDE, SISTER OUTSIDER (1984); 
Harris & Ordoiia, Developing Unity, in MAKING FACE, MAKING SouL, supra note 2; Molina, 
Recognizing, Accepting and Celebrating our Differences, in MAKING FACE, MAKING SOUL, supra 
note 2, at 326. The convergent focus on diversity and particularity thus transcends arguments 
about whether or not there is some important commonality among us, both in the sense that it 
appears when that is not the subject at hand and in the sense that even those who believe in 
commonality treat attention to diversity as an essential means of apprehending that 
commonality. 
24. Sesame Street (Children's Television Workshop, PBS). I do not mean to suggest that this 
is Sesame Street's only view on the subject of difference. They also have a very nice segment 
whose message is essentially the relational nature of difference. 
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all have in common, but what happens when we make a posited com-
monality the focus of our efforts at equality. I take Spelman's message 
to be that until we make difference our focus, we will simply presup-
pose a commonality without ever trying to learn about the lives, 
wishes, or ideas of those outside the group capable of making their 
presuppositions the ruling ones. 
The old feminist adage "the personal is the political" is still apt in 
its insistence on the central importance of personal experience - in all 
its specificity - as the starting point of theory and practice. But of 
course it simultaneously insists that it is possible to see the systemic 
patterns in personal ex;perience, indeed that that is the only way out of 
the webs of oppression in which we are trapped. Part of the problem 
that generated Spelman's book was the mistaken forms of generaliza-
tion engaged in by white middle-class feminists: my personal is the 
political. Recognizing the depth and destructiveness of that error 
must make us take seriously the scale of the problem we confront in 
trying to reconstitute the meaning of "the political" and the nature of 
its connections to our diverse personal experiences.25 Right now, the 
only way to avoid the imposition of the norms of the privileged is to 
attend to and respect difference. If we care about ending domination, 
we cannot afford to skip the hard and disruptive work entailed in mak-
ing difference central. Whatever the long-term prognosis for finding 
some shared essence of persons - through knowledge of our differ-
ences and the political achievement of a shared perspective - we can-
not simply posit commonality, however appealing as a sentiment or 
compelling as a condition for familiar forms of law and theory. 
Not just the abstractions of rights but the conventional notions of 
deliberation rest on unity, on some basic identity that can be the foun-
dation of shared values with respect to ·;both process and outcomes. In 
Iris Young's formulation, 
Impartial civilized reason characterizes the virtue of the republican man 
who rises above passion and desire. . . • Because virtues of impartiality 
and universality define the public realm, it precisely ought not to attend 
to our particularity. Modem normative reason and its political expres-
sion in the idea of the civic public, then, has unity and coherence by its 
expulsion and confinement of everything that would threaten to invade 
the polity with differentiation: the specificity of women's bodies and de-
sire, the difference of race and culture, the variability of heterogeneity of 
25. Spelman quotes K. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION: SLAVERY IN THE ANTE-
BELLUM SOUTH vii (1956): "I have assumed that the slaves were merely ordinary human beings, 
that innately Negroes are, after all, only white men with black skins, nothing more, nothing 
less." Spelman adds: 
[W]hite children like me ... were told by well-meaning white adults that Black people were 
just like us - never, however, that we were just like Blacks .... Herein lies a cautionary tale 
for feminists who insist that underneath or beyond the differences among women there must 
be some shared identity - as if commonality were a metaphysical given, as if a shared 
viewpoint were not a difficult political achievement. [pp. 12-13] 
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the needs, the goals and desires of each individual, the ambiguity and 
changeability of feeling. 26 
Once multiplicity becomes central, it is no longer clear how people 
can talk to each other and come to collective agreement - since our 
models of agreement (across interests that conflict but are constrained 
as to what counts, what can be heard) are premised on the underlying 
unity of reason Young describes. When we recognize and make space 
for the affective dimension of communication, we not only jar the the-
oretical basis for the unity necessary for deliberation; practically, we 
let loose the anger of those excluded, further compounding the prob-
lem of communication and collective deliberation. Both our image of 
deliberation for the common good and the relatively smooth practice 
of actual deliberation (however limited as against the ideal) rest on the 
domination of some by others. Whether in law faculties, legislatures, 
or leading journals, we have established a workable unitary voice by 
excluding those who would speak differently, or stipulating as a re-
quirement of their participation that they translate their voices into 
the dominant language. I think there is some despair in (privileged) 
theoretical and practical realms about what to do, how to reconstitute 
the conversation, when the dominance crumbles. And even those in-
terested in dismantling the dominance share an anxiety about how to 
talk to each other during the process. 
The problems are still more acute for adjudication. Notions of 
compromise or aggregation of interest as a substitute for a substantive 
(unitary) public good have had important (although flawed) currency 
in models of deliberation. But these models can be of very limited help 
in adjudication, where the norms of impartiality and universality (and 
the unity implicit in them) are at their strongest. 
Our understanding of impartiality must change if the presupposi-
tion of unity is lost in taking diversity seriously. If, as I argued earlier, 
there are no interchangeable As and Bs, if each event is completely 
unique in its necessary specificity, then treating like cases alike will be 
of little help in achieving impartiality. And if affect is admitted as a 
component of reason, then we must rethink the disinterestedness that 
permits impartiality. 
In fact, the common law might offer some assistance in this re-
thinking, in the form of its interesting twists on the theoretical notions 
of unity. For example, the common law model of the judge and two 
parties assumes that truth will emerge (or at least there will be fuller 
access to truth) from listening to different perceptions, to "both sides 
of the story."27 But in its current form, there are limits to the help this 
acknowledgment of perspective provides. First is the question of just 
26. Young, supra note 18, at 67. 
27. For many years now there has been commentary on the limits of a system that presumes 
there are only two sides to the story, two parties contesting, no matter how many ancillary briefs. 
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what the scope for difference is. To what extent must both parties cast 
their stories into the same framework, so that the opportunity for truly 
different perspectives is extremely constrained? In addition, the model 
is still premised on the possibility of a neutral arbiter who applies neu-
tral rules, equally applicable to all who come before him. 28 And these 
two limitations are connected, for the competing stories must both 
take place in the same framework, and thus be at some basic level 
commensurate, comparable, in order for the judge to imagine that 
there is a neutral means of adjudicating between them. 
An interesting complexity also arises with respect to the jury of 
one's peers: in the common law tradition, they should not be ignorant 
of circumstances; they should be local, have local knowledge, not mere 
universal knowledge. It is part of the meaning of "peers" that they are 
not behind a veil of ignorance. But they should be disinterested, have 
no stake in the outcome. This model of the jury comes close to captur-
ing what I take to be a widely shared notion that we can recognize at 
least degrees of interest and disinterestedness, and that the blindness 
required of justice does not extend to ignorance of context or to the 
exclusion of the capacity to empathize. One way of posing the prob-
lem of multiplicity is asking how to recast this common-sense notion. 
One might try to salvage impartiality by saying that judge, jury, 
and rules could at least be neutral with respect to the particular dis-
pute and the particular parties (thus disallowing family members). 
But legal scholarship of the past decades has given us good reason to 
doubt that there are any rules (and thus any disputes) that do not 
carry with them the very sorts of value judgments that create heated 
contests if the values are out in the open and all those who had an 
interest in them can be heard. There must be doubts about both the 
rules themselves (generated almost exclusively by white, male, middle-
and upper-class judges) and about the capacity of such judges to "ad-
judicate" fairly. 
What can adjudication mean if there is not only no unity across the 
participants and the community at large, but if the different perspec-
tives are in deep conflict with one another? One can only apply rules 
neutrally between parties if the rules are neutral between them and 
reflect some kind of consensus in the community. What if there is no 
such consensus? Or, what do we do when, at the very least, we cannot 
know whether there is consensus until all forums of decisionmaking 
are transformed by those whose voices have been silenced within 
them. 
The embrace of multiplicity thus confronts us with pressing 
problems over both the long and short terms. In the long term, we 
may wonder whether or not any new unity may emerge, not the false 
28. The male pronoun seems appropriate for this vision of the neutral arbiter. 
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unity achieved by dominance and exclusion, but a new one that incor-
porates rather than suppresses diversity, embodiedness, and affect. 
There is an important strain of reintegration in feminist theory. In 
these arguments the end of hierarchical oppression will make human 
wholeness possible by ending the arbitrary division of human capaci-
ties according to gender, race, class, and so on. And in that wholeness 
may be a new foundation for unity. 
There are also feminist perspectives on the issue of objectivity that 
help us rethink the search for truth and the possibility of theory-build-
ing when difference and multiple perspectives are at the foreground of 
our attention.29 For me, the most fascinating and helpful was Evelyn 
Fox Keller's discussion of the work of geneticist Barbara 
Maclintock. 3° Keller makes a persuasive case that it was Maclintock's 
stance of intimate connection, rather than "objective" distance, to her 
subject (com plants) and her focus on difference rather than sameness 
that made possible her breakthroughs in genetics. 
The theoretical work of feminists is helpful not only in thinking 
about the long-term possibility of unity, but also in confronting the 
rather overwhelming short-term problem of rethinking basic concepts 
such as deliberation, adjudication, impartiality, and disinterest. In the 
short term (which is the foreseeable future), we must find ways of 
reimagining the faculties and functions these concepts stand for with-
out the presupposition of identity or unity. As long as anything like 
the current systems of oppression are in place, the presupposition of 
unity will entail dominance, for unity can only be achieved by the sup-
pression of difference. The full implications of Spelman's arguments 
are thus that we need to learn to theorize, to deliberate, to make col-
lective decisions, to resolve disputes, in new, probably time-consuming 
and awkward ways. We need to treat diversity as central, not inciden-
tal; we need not merely to stop suppressing the conflicts and disrup-
tions of multiplicity, but to give up the power and privilege that has 
made that suppression possible. 
Of course, in this book Spelman does not try to provide new con-
ceptions of impartiality, adjudication, or deliberation. Nor have I 
tried to do so here. I have tried to show that if we accept Spelman's 
arguments, we can retain the prevailing conceptions only if we are 
willing to tolerate the exclusion, hierarchy, and domination implicit in 
their underlying assumptions of unity. Once we accept Spelman's con-
clusion, it will no longer do simply to say: "But I can't imagine a 
conception of impartiality without such unity." We must move on to 
the hard theoretical work of reexamining impartiality, and most of the 
29. See particularly Sandra Harding's discussions of the conflicting feminist approaches to 
perspective and objectivity in Harding, Introduction: ls There a Feminist Method'/, in FEMINISM 
AND METHODOLOGY: SOCIAL S~JENCE lssUES 1 (S. Harding ed. 1987). 
30. E. KELLER, supra note 23, at 158-76. 
May 1991] Challenges of Multiplicity 1609 
other concepts basic to legal and political theory, to see how they can 
be made consistent with a conception of equality rooted in difference. 
And we need to open up the deliberative practices we participate in so 
that they no longer support the privilege Spelman so effectively 
reveals. Her arguments do not tell us what the new institutional or 
theoretical forms will look like. But they move us to see that they are 
required. 
